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S

ince the 1980s, the rhetoric of fiscal decentralization has taken root in de
veloping countries. Most developing countries now place the strengthen
ing of subnational government on the development policy agenda. Despite
all the pronouncements, plans, and even political promises, however, there has
been no rush to grant state and local governments significant taxing powers and
increased expenditure autonomy. Perhaps economic conditions have not been
right for countries to adopt all-encompassing decentralization schemes, perhaps
political freedoms were too new in some cases, or perhaps the idea still takes
some getting used to. Whatever the reason, signs that countries are now ready to
move forward with implementing fiscal decentralization continue to appear.
Many analyses attest to the efficacy of fiscal decentralization as a policy
strategy. Most existing research focuses on evaluating decentralization experi
ences from around the world and looks for the links between theory and practice. Much less attention has been given to implementation strategies (Bahl
1999b). This chapter offers some guidelines for both design and implementation—
beginning with a discussion of the rationale for fiscal decentralization—by
analyzing objectives, opportunities, and risks that should lead the design of a
decentralization program.

. Among them are Bahl and Linn (1992); Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006a, b); Bird and
Vaillancourt (1998); Dillinger and Webb (1999a, b); Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird (1998); and
Tanzi (1995).

Ingram, G. K., & Hong, Y. (Eds.). (2008). Fiscal decentralization and land policies. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Created from gsu on 2022-11-18 20:41:30.

19

20

Roy Bahl

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

What Is Fiscal Decentralization?
“The empowerment of people by the empowerment of their local governments”
is offered here as a working definition of fiscal decentralization. The key term is
“local government.” Fiscal decentralization is about a central government pass
ing budgetary authority to subnational governments through the power to make
taxing and spending decisions. In this chapter, fiscal decentralization means trans
ferring fiscal power to any level of government below the center, such as states or
provinces, cities or districts, and even fourth-tier local governments.
What is not included in this definition of fiscal decentralization? The decon
centration of decision making and service delivery powers within a ministry
would not count. Deconcentration decentralizes administration and manage
ment, and even some decision making. Although deconcentration could be used
to gain inputs about needs and demands particular to a local area, higher-level
government retains the dominant voice in local planning committees, even when
elected local officials are given a seat on such committees. Deconcentration of
this kind does not empower the local population. Nor would we count the dele
gation of service delivery powers to community interest groups or nongovern
mental organizations (NGOs). Although these units may be locally based, they
are not empowered by vote of the entire community, nor are they accountable to
the local population. To be sure, the community-centered, informal organization
approach can enhance the probability of successful decentralization by provid
ing a lobby voice for local interest groups. Often, it can enable an otherwise
disenfranchised group to gain a voice in governance. In no way does it substitute
for representative local government, though. Another version of “private decen
tralization” would allow community groups (neighborhoods) to select their own
package of public services. In developing countries, this approach might draw
significant resources away from the local government budget and compromise
its ability to allocate resources according to voter preferences.
One gray area to consider is where subnational governments are not elected,
as in China. In this case, local populations cannot use the vote to hold central
officials accountable. Subnational governments, however, are empowered with
some budgetary discretion, and the appointed political leadership does respond

. In some higher-income countries, the decentralization of decisions regarding collective
goods might extend even further, as it has with private community associations in the United
States. These associations, governed by officers elected by the community group, ensure that
the preferences of very small groups of homeowners are honored by covenants. Approximately
20 percent of the U.S. population now lives in some form of community association. Nelson
(see chapter 13) argues that these community associations are fast replacing traditional local
governments in parts of the United States as the unit responsible for delivering some local
services. Governments in some less developed countries are attracted by the community devel
opment model. In Pakistan, for example, community groups exercise a degree of control over
a share of the budgetary resources of the general local government.
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to local preferences. In fact, China is a good case in point. In the significant
intergovernmental fiscal reforms enacted since the 1980s, the central govern
ment was constrained in its choices by the need to appease the coastal provinces
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006b). Moreover, provincial-level officials regu
larly act in the self-interest of their provinces, such as by enacting protectionist
policies, even when provincial policies might compromise national objectives.
A second gray area is the case of local governments with limited budgetary
discretion. In many developing and transition countries, central governments
limit local revenue powers and impose expenditure mandates to such an extent
that even elected local governments become little more than spending agents of
higher-level governments. Still, these local governments do have some discre
tion, they are technically accountable to the local population who elects them,
and they have the potential to assume a greater degree of autonomy.

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

Why Fiscal Decentralization? The Rhetoric
There seems to be no uniform rhetoric about why a nation should adopt a fiscal
decentralization strategy. The justification varies from country to country, and,
not surprisingly, it usually matches up well with the problems the country is fac
ing. Fiscal decentralization is often more a remedy than a development strategy.
Russia’s fiscal decentralization looks very much like one designed to head off
separatist movements, and South Africa’s transfer of decision-making power
to more than 800 local governments is exactly what one would expect in the
aftermath of apartheid. Advantages and disadvantages aside, various advocates
see decentralization as primarily an economic, political, social, management, or
even military strategy. The way these national leaders see it will drive the way
they design it, which also explains why the rhetoric in support of fiscal decen
tralization is so varied and perhaps even why there is such a gap between the
rhetoric and the reality of successful decentralization.
Many would like to believe that fiscal decentralization is an effective eco
nomic development strategy. Intuitively, the argument appears reasonable. The
government closest to the local or regional economy is in the right position to
decide matters such as the best regulatory environment for local business, the
right infrastructure investments to make, the proper structure of taxation, and,
in general, the enabling environment best suited to develop the local economy.
Lady Ursula Hicks had this argument in mind in her 1961 book, Development from Below. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000) develop the interest
ing point that the possible effects of decentralization on economic development
are indirect, that decentralization directly affects technical efficiency, income
inequality, and corruption, which, in turn, affect economic growth. The search
for empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and eco
nomic development has not been conclusive, however (Davoodi and Zou 1998;
Lin and Liu 2000; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000; Zhang and Zou 1997,
1998).
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The growing number of countries with democratically elected governments
clearly has stimulated interest in decentralized government. Those interested in
the politics of nation development would argue that this factor has been para
mount in stimulating at least the rhetoric of and probably the demand for fis
cal decentralization. It is not all rhetoric. Elected politicians at the subnational
government level push hard for some powers to shape budgets, although they
are much more enthusiastic about having power to spend than they are about
having power to tax.
Centralization may be an inefficient management approach, especially in
large countries. Fiscal management—that is, supervision of some part of the
budgetary affairs of every subnational government—can become costly and lead
to poor public service outcomes. It is especially troublesome in large countries.
A relatively few central officials cannot make the important fiscal decisions for
every local government on a case-by-case basis. There are too many complica
tions, too many special circumstances, for this approach to be viable. China
and India have populations in excess of one billion, and China has 58,545
subnational governments and India 237,687. Brazil has a land area in excess
of 8.4 million square kilometers, and Indonesia comprises 17,500 islands, of
which 6,000 are inhabited. How could Russia, a country with 11 time zones, be
managed efficiently from Moscow by a relatively few senior officials? As late as
the mid-1990s, though, the budget of each of the 89 regional governments was
being approved in Moscow on the basis of face-to-face negotiations. Some form
of decentralized governance would seem an imperative in large countries.
The problems with centralized control are not limited to large countries.
Even in small nations, poor transportation and communications networks can
make the national capital very remote. In Nepal, for example, many of the 4,053
local governments are several days’ journey from Kathmandu.
Fiscal decentralization is a strategy that sells because people want different
things from their local governments. Centralization, on the other hand, implies
a degree of uniformity in government services and in revenue raising. Enforced
uniformity creates resentment, however, and various regions within countries
have pushed hard for autonomy to choose a package of services that better
fits their demands. Countries with variations among regions in language (India,
Sudan), ethnic background (Indonesia, Nigeria), or climate and terrain (Russia)
are usually good candidates for fiscal decentralization. Even countries that are
relatively homogeneous in population mix and climate may be pressured for
different service standards in urban and rural areas, or in regions with different
economic bases.

. China has 151 prefectures and 185 prefecture-level cities; 1,903 counties and 279 countylevel cities; 56,027 townships, towns, and city districts.
. India has 3,609 urban local bodies, 474 zilla parishads in rural areas, 5,906 panchayat
samitis, and 227,698 gram panchayats.
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Another explanation of the increased demand for fiscal decentralization in
recent years is the improved management and administrative capacity of local
governments. In the past, the issue with local governments was their inability
to deliver services effectively or to manage money. Although many of the same
criticisms are leveled today, many local governments are “growing up” in terms
of their management and administrative abilities. Affordable microcomputer
systems, improved education, and the greater relative attractiveness of employ
ment in the subnational government sector have all contributed to this change.
Indonesia’s local governments have taken on significant increases in expenditure
responsibility, South Africa’s urban local governments are nearly self-sufficient
in financing their budgets, and the state governments in Brazil and Argentina
play important roles in their federal systems. When subnational governments
feel ready, they bring pressure for more fiscal autonomy.
Some attribute the current interest in decentralization to the consideration
that the time for local autonomy has come. Local elections, improved adminis
trative capacity, and “local nationalism” have made the demand for fiscal de
centralization irresistible. If it is not given in a formal way, local autonomy may
be achieved through “backdoor” approaches. A good example is Chinese local
government officials who were denied formal taxing powers but who levied
informal (often illegal) taxes that were kept in off-budget accounts. Local gov
ernments did take on more fiscal autonomy on the revenue and the expenditure
side in response to a demand for local services that higher-level governments
were unwilling to fund. This backdoor approach, however, created inefficien
cies in how the funds were raised and in spending from segmented, extrabudget
ary accounts (Bahl 1999a; Wong, Heady, and Woo 1995). It may be far better
to structure a program of fiscal autonomy than to have it taken on an ad hoc
basis.
Perhaps the most compelling argument has to do with service delivery. The
level and quality of local public services provided in most developing countries
is poor. “The job is not getting done anyway, so let’s try another approach” is an
argument that gets a great deal of sympathy and support. In many camps, there
is a belief that more local control over expenditure decisions can make things
better. Intuitive arguments support this belief. Subnational governments are best
positioned to determine the location of capital investments. They can recognize
benefits, they may better manage the performance of employees working at the
local level, and they have a greater stake in maintaining local public capital.
Local voters feel more likely to be “heard” by local politicians and bureaucrats
than by central politicians and bureaucrats.
Finally, decentralization may be a part of the strategy to hold countries to
gether or may be a strategy for nation building. Some nations have been formed
out of unnatural partners and have dissolved when the opportunity arose, such
as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In cases such as Indonesia, South Africa, and
Russia, the fall of strong central regimes has prompted a call to move governance
away from the central level and has stimulated fiscal decentralization initiatives.
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Other troublesome partnerships have played to special autonomy measures in
attempts to hold the country together, as in Nigeria and Sudan. Even in the case
of reunifications as in Vietnam, Germany, and China–Hong Kong, decentraliza
tion plays an important role.

The Benefits
The design of a program of fiscal decentralization that has a chance for success
must move from rhetoric to an identification of the potential benefits and costs
of this policy and to the possibilities for realizing these benefits and costs. The
main reason the rhetoric of fiscal decentralization has not been translated into
a widespread growth in the relative importance of local government finance is
that the benefits and costs have not been properly understood or accepted. Im
plementation plans for fiscal decentralization are almost always flawed.

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

EFFICIENCY GAINS

Rhetoric is necessary to popularize the concept of decentralization and per
haps make it more politically acceptable. It is, however, often based on im
pressionistic evidence. What is needed in the national debate about fiscal de
centralization is a more structured approach to capturing the benefits of fiscal
decentralization.
What are the major advantages to be captured? The first, and most impor
tant, is the welfare gains that come from moving government closer to the peo
ple. This economic efficiency argument drives the thinking of most economists
who work on this subject (Musgrave and Musgrave 1984; Oates 1972). The
argument is straightforward. Let us assume that people’s preferences for gov
ernment services vary, for example, because of religion, language, ethnic mix,
climate, or economic base. Let us assume further that people living within a
country or even a city have sorted themselves so that those with like preferences
live in proximity. If subnational governments respond to these preferences in
structuring their budgets, decentralization will result in variations in the pack
age of services delivered in different regions. People will get what they want, so
the welfare of the population will be enhanced.
Under the same circumstances, but with a centralized system, service provi
sion would be more uniform and people in different regions would get less of
the service mix they want. The potential benefits from decentralization, then,
include (1) more accountability on the part of government officials because they
are responsible for service delivery to the local population who elected them;
and (2) more willingness on the part of the local population to pay for services
because they get what they want.
For advocates of fiscal decentralization, this scenario is the primary argu
ment. True believers can point out that successful fiscal decentralization at
once attacks several problems that face developing countries: revenue mobili
zation, innovation in economic decision making, accountability of elected offi
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cials, capacity development at the local level, and grassroots participation in
governance.
This view of the benefits of decentralization makes it easy to believe that
welfare gains exist even if they cannot be measured. Whether the conditions
necessary are in place to capture these benefits is another story. Even if gains
do materialize, are they large enough to warrant the possible disruption of the
national public financing system?
To capture the gains from fiscal decentralization, a number of conditions
must be met. First, regional and local legislatures must be accountable to the
regional/local population. If local political leadership is elected, does the elector
ate have the information and willingness to exercise the vote to ensure account
ability? If these political leaders are appointed rather than elected (as in China),
do they see their political success as being related to the satisfaction of the local
population? The middle ground is a type of parliamentary system whose lead
ers are elected by and possibly more accountable to the party than to the local
population.
Second, the chief officers of the regional/local government must be account
able to their legislature. If they are appointed by the center/state, their first ac
countability will be to a higher level of government, and local programs may not
be delivered according to local preferences. The mayor’s directive about enforce
ment of property tax penalties for failure to pay may have a hollow ring if the
chief local tax collector is appointed by the state or central government.
Third, subnational governments should have some independent taxing pow
ers. Provincial and local governments should have the ability to set at least the
tax rate. This power is important if the local population is to hold the political
leadership accountable. Local voters will subject politicians to a much tougher
test if voters pay for services than if services are financed primarily by a transfer
from the center.
Fourth, subnational governments should be responsible for some impor
tant government services. The issue here is that the local voters should care
about the quality of services delivered. In most cases, states and provinces are
assigned services that affect the quality of people’s lives, so this criterion is
satisfied. In the case of local (third-tier) governments, this assignment of impor
tant responsibilities is not always the case. When local governments are given
responsibility for little more than housekeeping functions, the local population
will be less likely to raise strenuous objections about the quality of services
delivered.
Fifth, subnational governments should have adequate discretion over the
level and composition of expenditures. If a higher-level government mandates

. Indirect evidence that the efficiency gains are being captured includes increased satisfaction
with local public services, changes in the mix of service provided to better satisfy local prefer
ences, electoral results, and increased compliance with local taxes and user charges.
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the expenditures, the subnational government has little ability to respond to
citizen preferences. Excessive mandates can be a major impediment to fiscal
decentralization. In some cases, mandates are necessary for achieving overarch
ing social goals, such as guaranteed quality of education or equalization in the
distribution of resources among local (third-tier) governments.
The efficiency gains that might be captured with fiscal decentralization are
far from automatic. A structure must be in place to allow the subnational govern
ment to capture these gains. In fact, these necessary conditions are often missing.

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

REVENUE MOBILIZATION

In developing and transition economies, state and local governments are as
signed relatively little independent taxing power. The higher-level government
may fear the tax base competition, the prospect that increased state and local
government tax collections will be accomplished at the expense of lower central
government taxes.
That decentralization can increase overall revenue mobilization in a country
by broadening the aggregate tax base is, in fact, a more reasonable hypothesis. If
this hypothesis is correct, subnational government taxes would not be raised at
the expense of reductions in central-level taxes. In addition, the claim of subna
tional governments on central revenues via intergovernmental transfers would be
reduced by increased revenue mobilization at the subnational government level.
The argument behind this hypothesis is that subnational governments have
the potential to reach the traditional income, consumption, and wealth tax bases
in ways that the central government cannot. Typically, central governments rely
on a combination of company income tax, individual income tax, value-added
tax, and excise taxes. In most developing countries, however, these taxes have a
high entry threshold. Small firms and most individuals are “underrepresented”
in the tax base. In fact, local governments can broaden the overall tax base with
a variety of tax instruments and administrative measures, and they do so in
many countries.
In developing and transition countries, most individual income taxes are
collected through withholding from workers in the formal sector. The threshold
is set high enough that only a small fraction of the population is included in the
tax net. In Indonesia, a country with a population of more than 200 million, the
income tax base includes only about 1 million people. Even when their income
is above the threshold, self-employed workers often escape taxes because of
administrative difficulties, and overall collection rates tend to be quite low. The
problem is identifying self-employed workers (informal sector) and determining
their tax liability. The self-employed taxpayers play “catch me if you can,” and
the central government often sees the cost of the chase to be greater than the
revenue rewards. Local governments, though, with a better knowledge of the
local economy, can identify the tax base more easily. Given the paucity of local
government resources, the revenue returns are potentially lucrative. Subnational
government payroll taxes, levied in a simple way, can augment the national rev
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enue take. These taxes might be justified as a kind of user charge for the provi
sion of local public services.
The company income tax is usually focused on large firms. In market econ
omies, smaller firms are covered, but typically under an alternative form of
company tax. In transition economies, private businesses and collective enter
prises—very rapidly growing sectors—are often outside the tax net for admin
istrative reasons.
The value-added tax (VAT) has a very high threshold and typically excludes
most enterprises from the tax base. Most VAT revenues are collected from a
small number of firms, and it is administratively inefficient to focus heavily on
the “hard to tax” for the little revenue they generate. The situation in Guate
mala, where 97 percent of VAT revenues are collected from one-third of the
VAT-paying firms (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace 1996), is not atypi
cal. These high thresholds for central taxes, however, leave a significant taxable
capacity unreached. Ample taxing room can be found in this situation. Subna
tional governments may levy a variety of taxes on the sales or assets of these
companies, or even charges for the privilege to operate. Included are asset taxes
on businesses, property taxes, gross sales taxes on small firms, and narrowbased retail sales taxes.
In general, the high thresholds set for central government taxes can be at
tributed to two factors. First, the lack of familiarity with the local tax base
makes it very difficult to identify the small taxpayers and to maintain a tax roll.
Second, the revenue gains from bringing small taxpayers into the net are small.
A local government policy analyst, however, might propose another view. The
analyst might point out that the local governments do have familiarity with the
local tax base. They oversee a variety of licensing and regulatory activities, and
they track property ownership and land-based transactions. They have ample
opportunity to identify businesses in their community and gain some knowledge
about the real property assets and scale of operations. A convincing case could
be made that the potential revenue from these activities may be quite large when
compared with the overall size of the local government budget.
In particular, a strong case could be made for the real property tax as a local
government revenue source. Familiarity with the tax base gives local governments
a comparative administrative advantage, and it offers the opportunity to connect
tax payments to the benefits of local services provided. In addition, central gov
ernments often do not want this tax. Further, the property tax can, in theory, give
local governments access to a large and growing tax base. Still, elected officials
may be hesitant to levy such an unpopular tax on the local voting population.

. Subnational governments often fail to gain access to broad-based taxes for two reasons:
(1) the center is unwilling to give up or share the revenue base; and (2) the subnational govern
ment is wary of taking on responsibility to enforce these taxes.
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REGIONAL BALANCE

Another argument posits that if fiscal decentralization goes far enough, a better
size distribution of regions (cities) would result. The traditional theory of migra
tion holds that an individual’s decision about movement, say from a rural to an
urban area, is determined by his or her assessment of the probability of finding
employment in the urban versus rural area and by the difference in the expected
wage. Business and individual location decisions are driven by the quality of pub
lic services available and by the cost of these services.
A problem in developing countries is that local governments, even in large
metropolitan areas, are often financed primarily by intergovernmental transfers
rather than local taxes. The tax price for local services in these cities is therefore
low. If local governments were forced to raise a greater proportion of their own
revenues, the marginal cost of living in cities (and probably in higher-income re
gions) would rise because residents and businesses would now pay the marginal
cost of service provision. If the tax disparities among regions, and among urban–
rural places, grew large enough, presumably some urban migration would be
discouraged. Whether migration to more prosperous regions and to cities could
be discouraged to any significant degree by greater tax and user charge differen
tials is a question that calls for more research.

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

NATION BUILDING

When citizens participate in their own governance, as in a decentralized sys
tem, a greater measure of national stability may be achieved. In countries where
the ethnic or religious mix of the population has created divides, the threat of
disharmony, or even civil war, is present. Part of this problem is due to differ
ent preferences for public services, and part is due to the desire for more selfgovernance.
Fiscal decentralization can offer a compromise between the status quo and
secession in such cases. By enabling some degree of regional autonomy, the cen
tral government might satisfy the demand for more control over public services.
This local autonomy might be achieved by a federal structure of government
(Nigeria, India) or by special local autonomy laws (Indonesia, Philippines).

The Costs
The limited growth in fiscal decentralization may be explained by the costs of
giving up the considerable advantages of fiscal centralization. It has long been
argued by public finance theorists that fiscal policy to address stabilization and
growth issues, and distribution policy, can be more effectively managed by cen
tral governments. Whether subnational government fiscal decisions seriously
compromise the effectiveness of central government policy in these areas is
controversial.
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STABILIZATION POLICY IS NOT PROTECTED

Developing and transition economies are by their very nature unstable. Develop
ing countries often depend on a small number of primary exports (agricultural or
mineral). A change in world market prices can have devastating effects on such
a country. Movements in world economic conditions can slow the rate of eco
nomic growth of “vulnerable” countries. World recession, for example, could slow
the rate of foreign investment, reduce the demand for exports, discourage tour
ism, and so forth. Smaller countries are especially vulnerable. Their economies
tend to be the most exposed, and even a natural disaster (hurricane, earthquake,
drought, or epidemic such as AIDS) can have lasting and disastrous effects.
This volatility in economies is transmitted to the public sector, and it can even
be magnified. Swings in world interest rates and real exchange rates directly de
termine the real cost of servicing foreign debt, sales taxes respond automatically
to swings in consumption, and public expenditures move with inflation and un
employment. The Inter-American Development Bank (1997, 113–114) makes the
interesting points that indirect tax revenues in Latin American countries are 2.5
times more volatile than in industrial countries and that public expenditures are
four times more volatile. Faced with this potential for instability, central govern
ments believe that, to implement effective stabilization policy, they must control a
substantial portion of total government revenues and expenditures. The ministry
of finance in virtually all countries would like to control (1) the tax rate and the
tax base of all major taxes; (2) expenditure assignment and determination of the
level of expenditures; and (3) borrowing by local governments. How can a pro
gram be put in place to control inflation and the size of the deficit when a signifi
cant percentage of national spending and taxation is in the hands of subnational
government politicians who do not have a vested interest in pursuing stabiliza
tion policy? The situation is exacerbated when the subnational governments do
not face a hard budget constraint and when they have borrowing powers.
Central governments would like the flexibility to respond quickly to changes
in the economy so as to raise taxes or cut expenditures to deal with a deficit, for
example. If the government is locked into a fixed share of revenue allocated to
local governments, the ability to cut the deficit by reducing expenditures is sig
nificantly reduced. The pressures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank for more austere economic policy to bring about internal
or external balance usually requires maintaining an acceptable level of the fiscal
deficit and limiting the level of domestic credit. In a truly decentralized economy,
both targets are more difficult to achieve than in a centralized economy. Decen
tralized countries are not inherently more unstable than centralized countries.

. See Bahl and Linn (1992), Prud’homme (1995), Spahn (1997), Tanzi (1995), and TerMinassian (1997) for more detailed discussions. These papers show that there is anything but
agreement on this point.
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Whatever the degree of inherent instability of a country, the ability to control the
fiscal sector would seem more limited in the decentralized system.
Finally, does borrowing by subnational governments compromise macro
economic stability in developing countries? The case of Brazil, where state-level
debt contributed to a national fiscal crisis and forced central government inter
vention, is the example most often mentioned (Ter-Minassian and Craig 1997).
The problem, according to some, was an unwise decision to rely on market
discipline to control the issuance of debt.
On the other hand, borrowing by subnational governments has not compro
mised the fiscal position in many other countries where it is allowed. This situation
usually is attributed to the imposition of some form of control—either rule-based
or direct administrative controls—over state and local government borrowing.

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT MUST BE CENTRALLY DIRECTED

Capital is short in most developing and transition countries, and subnational
governments have a low savings rate. Some would argue that the net result of
fiscal decentralization, then, could be a shift of resources from central govern
ments that have higher rates of savings and investment to provincial and local
governments that spend at a greater rate on consumption goods and services.
With this conclusion, fiscal decentralization could therefore lead to a lower rate
of spending on infrastructure, and national growth could be harmed.
Three points should be made. First, local governments have been assigned
functions that are consumption-intensive (primary schools, provision of safe drinking water), and these expenditures contribute to economic growth. Second, even
if there were a local preference for capital spending, central mandates (particu
larly for subnational government wage and salary levels) may drive the budgets
of lower-level governments toward consumption spending. Finally, subnational
governments lack access to revenues adequate to generate capital financing.
Another line of thinking poses that, in developing countries, national priori
ties for capital investment should trump those that conform to local government
choices. The national government is interested in investments in infrastructure
that have regional and national benefits, such as irrigation, national (interstate)
roads, and power. State governments, especially large states in large countries,
focus on capital investments with regional benefits, such as highways, universi
ties, and hospitals. Local governments, on the other hand, are expected to place
more emphasis on projects with local benefits, such as markets, small area water
supply, municipal buildings, and recreation areas. Those interested in maximiz
ing economic growth would argue that the big national infrastructure projects
should dominate. Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that overall welfare
will be increased if local governments play a role in project selection. Also, a fear
persists that local governments either cannot, or will not, build their facilities to
proper standards and that they will not maintain them at adequate levels. The
case for provincial involvement in capital project selection is stronger in coun
tries where the provinces are large and have stronger service delivery capability.
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EQUALIZATION POTENTIAL IS GREATER UNDER
REVENUE CENTRALIZATION

Copyright © 2008. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. All rights reserved.

Most developing and transition countries are characterized by significant inter
regional disparities in income and wealth. Poor regions within a country typi
cally have a low taxable capacity and a high level of expenditure need. It usually
falls to the central government to do something about equalizing the resulting
fiscal disparities. One of the most common methods of addressing these dispari
ties is a system of equalization transfers.
Revenue centralization provides a greater potential for equalization. In
countries where the claim of local governments on the overall tax base is small,
the central government can create a larger pool of funds for allocation among
local governments on an equalizing basis. Just because the central government
has more funds to allocate, however, does not necessarily mean that it will al
locate these funds on an equalizing basis. In fact, most countries do very little
equalization through their grant systems.
The decentralization of both revenue-raising power and expenditure respon
sibility can be a counterequalizing policy in developing countries. When local gov
ernments are given taxing powers, or more expenditure responsibilities and some
borrowing authority, the higher-income places are best positioned to take advan
tage of these newfound powers. They have the fiscal capacity to tax and usually
have a better ability to collect taxes, the technical ability to deliver more public
services, and the repayment potential that enables borrowing to finance capital im
provements. Under a fully decentralized fiscal system, one would expect a growing
gap in well-being between rich and poor regions. This argument is more a hypoth
esis than it is based on hard research, in part because richer places always seem
to do better, whether located in centralized or decentralized countries. Those who
have studied the issue, however, tend to support the hypothesis that decentralized
tax assignment leads to larger fiscal disparities because it allows local governments
with a stronger taxable capacity to make use of their comparative advantage.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS ARE MORE COMPETENT

The superior ability of central governments to deliver public services and collect
taxes is another argument for centralization. Central competency is believed to
be superior for a number of reasons. It can be argued that the best and bright
est government officials are drawn to that level where their opportunity for
advancement is greatest. Moreover, they are drawn to “where the action is,”
and central governments in developing countries account for 85 percent of all
government expenditures. Perhaps most important is that central officials have
significant experience doing the job of service delivery and tax collection, and
they are often well up the learning curve from local government employees.
On the other hand, no hard-and-fast evidence exists that central govern
ments can deliver services for all functions at a lower cost or higher quality
than can local governments. The experience in Indonesia offers perhaps the best
form of transition. Central government employees who were already involved in
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providing the services were transferred to the jurisdiction of local governments
and the quality—and cost—of these public services did not suffer.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS ARE LESS CORRUPT

Another argument against stronger local government is the corruption that is
bred from the “closeness” between elected local politicians and the local po
litical power structure. Both Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1995) present this
view. Another line of reasoning, making the same point, is that the probability of
successful stealing is increased by weakening central authority and monitoring.
Various students of corruption place the blame on the greater number of con
tacts with public officials in developing countries, on lower-paid public officials
having more incentive to steal than higher-paid central officials, and on voters at
the local government level who have not yet learned to use their power to moni
tor and discipline their employees.
The case that corruption and decentralization are inherently linked is, ar
guably, weak, however. Certainly, no good empirical evidence supports this
contention. As suggested by Guess, Loehr, and Martinez-Vazquez (1997), the
perception that fiscal decentralization and corruption are related may reflect
only that localized corruption is more transparent.
Empirical work on the relationship between decentralization and corrup
tion is inconclusive. Fisman and Gatti (2002), for example, find that corruption
is lower in more decentralized countries; Treisman (2000) finds corruption to be
higher in federal than in unitary countries.
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Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
The success or failure of fiscal decentralization in developing countries results as
much from implementation as from program design. In particular, when intro
ducing decentralization policies and administration, sequencing is key.
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006b) have argued that there is an optimal
pattern of sequencing that is applicable for most countries. Even before begin
ning the implementation, two prerequisites are necessary for success: a rule of
law and an existing deconcentration of public service delivery. The former makes
it possible for subnational governments to protest violations of the decentraliza
tion law, even those committed by the central government. The latter makes it
possible to shift central employees to local status without having to train a new
force of local public employees.
The sequencing of decentralization should begin with two important steps
(figure 2.1). The first is to hold a national debate about decentralization, pos
sibly in the context of an election or the report of a national commission. It is
better to deal with objections up front, or else the national debate could disrupt

. For a good review, see Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado, and Boex (2007).
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Figure 2.1
Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization: A Normative Approach
Step 6: Monitor, Evaluate, and Retrofit
Step 5: Implement the Decentralization Program
Step 4: Develop the Implementing Regulations
Step 3: Pass the Decentralization Law
Step 2: Do the Policy Design and Develop a White Paper
Step 1: Carry Out a National Debate on the Issues
Related to Decentralization Policy

		

The Platform: Deconcentration, Rule of Law, etc.

Source: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006b).
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program implementation after it is under way. National discussion should cul
minate in a policy paper on fiscal decentralization that lays out the goals of the
program and the strategy for achieving it. These steps make up the road map for
the decentralization program. The policy paper would include matters such as
the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, the nature of the intergovernmen
tal transfer system, and the revenue-raising powers of subnational governments.
Going forward without a policy guideline would be tantamount to adopting a
“make it up as we go” strategy.
Based on this road map, the decentralization law can be written. This key
document of the program will guide all else that is done in the implementation
process. Although the law must contain the key features of the program, it must
not be too specific because legal drafting cannot accommodate all the realities of
administration that will arise.
The administrative phase begins with developing the implementing regula
tions that accompany the decentralization law. For example, the law may specify
an equalizing grant program, but the implementing regulations may specify the
exact formula to be used in distribution. The implementing regulations must
conform with the decentralization law. If there are no implementing regulations,
or if they are not clearly written, policy making would implicitly fall into the
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hands of bureaucrats. With these implementing regulations in hand, the pro
gram can be brought on line.
A final step in the process is to provide for monitoring and evaluation. Fis
cal decentralization programs emerge and change over time, sometimes due to
poorly formulated policy and sometimes due to the changing needs of the coun
try. It is important to have in place a process for fine-tuning the structure. This
process of gradual reformulation underlines the reasons why it is dangerous to
include too much detail about decentralization in the constitution.
One problem with the stepwise approach to implementing decentralization
proposed here is that it makes the process very transparent and vulnerable to
criticism. It also requires time, especially at the stage when the program is being
formulated, which gives the opposition time to organize their objections and
their constituency. Another approach is simply to push ahead before opponents
can get organized and to get the law written and adopted. The hope in this strat
egy, as was the case in the big-bang decentralization in Indonesia, is that once
the law is written, there will be no turning back.
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Is Fiscal Decentralization a Development Elixir?
It is easy for advocates to get enthusiastic about fiscal decentralization. It offers
the opportunity to improve service delivery, increase the rate of revenue mobi
lization, involve citizens more closely in the process of governance, and help
resolve conflict within disaffected regions.
In fact, fiscal decentralization is not a panacea for economic development
problems. The potential effects are real enough, but developing economies often
do not have the economic, institutional, and administrative wherewithal to cap
ture these benefits. Moreover, the costs of decentralization can be too high for
developing economies.
Countries around the world have moved only slowly toward the adoption
of decentralized intergovernmental fiscal systems. Despite the advantages, no
hard evidence shows a strong trend toward fiscal decentralization. Based on
IMF Government Finance Statistics, which is one of only a few comparable data
sources available, the subnational government share of public expenditures has
remained at about 13 to 14 percent in developing countries since the 1970s.
The rather remarkable stability in the subnational government expenditure
share is reported in table 2.1 for developing countries and for Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries.
These results are not all surprising. The costs of decentralization are ex
tremely high for less developed countries. Subnational government finance is

. Here, decentralization is measured as the subnational government share of total government
expenditure in the country, that is, subnational government expenditures in the numerator and
total central plus subnational government expenditures in the denominator.
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Table 2.1
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators
1970s

1980s

1990s to 2000s

OECD
Developing
OECD
Developing
OECD
Transition
Developing
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries

Subnational
government tax
as a share of total
government tax

10.68
(43)

17.91
(24)

8.87
(33)

18.18
(23)

10.61
(28)

18.39
(21)

22.41
(23)

Subnational
government
expenditure
as a share of
total government
expenditure

13.42
(45)

33.68
(23)

12.09
(41)

31.97
(24)

12.97
(54)

32.68
(24)

30.32
(24)
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Note: Sample sizes are in parentheses.
Source: Bahl and Wallace (2005, 91).

a type of luxury good whose benefits come only slowly to low-income coun
tries. The political costs are also very high. Central bureaucracies are firmly
entrenched, often since independence, and difficult to move. Even at the local
level, the traditions of central control seem inviolate. Local voters, at whom
these benefits are aimed, often have not yet learned enough about their power.
What to make of all this divergence between the rhetoric and the outcomes?
Is decentralization an interesting idea that just hasn’t caught on? Perhaps not.
The trends presented in table 2.1 are deceiving. The period studied coincides
with the introduction and growth of value-added taxes in developing countries.
Because the VAT is such a revenue productive central government tax in most
countries, the existence of a “flypaper effect” suggests that there would have
been an increased share of spending at the central level. That subnational gov
ernments held a constant share of expenditures is evidence of continued support
for decentralization as a development strategy.
Two other dimensions of fiscal decentralization make its success difficult
to evaluate. First, the primary objectives may vary from country to country.
Holding off dissolution may have driven the Russian design, whereas involving
new voters in governance may have been paramount in South Africa. A global
evaluation of fiscal decentralization programs is likely to be less accurate than
a series of country case studies. Second, program design may be flawed in some
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countries, and implementation is always complicated. The result is that fiscal
decentralization goes slowly, and its effects take time to show up.
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